How Editors and Universities Need to Work Together to Prevent Misconduct

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Presentation at 2nd World Conference on Research Integrity, Singapore, 21-24 July 2010

Introduction


The self-policing of 'The Republic of Science'

- Academic misconduct is rare, generally low-level, and self-correcting.
- Any serious misconduct is quickly detected by peer review and stopped.
- The risks of being caught and the resulting sanctions are so great that **few** are **tempted** to stray down this route.

But assumes

- peer review succeeds in detecting misconduct
- editors (& publishers etc.) and universities work together

Case-study – what happens when editors and universities **do not** work closely together?



Hypothesis 1

Borderline plagiarism?



3. The experience curve

The concept of declining costs and prices resulting from learning as expressed in the accumulated experience of a firm has been extensively developed and applied by the Boston Consulting Group [3] with further clarification and specification by Spence [15], Fudenberg and Tirole [6], Hart [10], to name only a few. Apparently the earliest identification of the particular form of the experience curve was found in the study of learning curves for airframes. Arrow [1] utilized this form in his pioneering paper, and the same form has been employed by the Boston Consulting Group. The marginal cost function, called the experience curve is

$$MCY(t) = C_1[Y(t)]^{-\lambda}$$
 (1)

where MC[Y(t)] is the cost of producing the Yth unit of output, Y(t) is the accumulation output at time t, C_1 is a scaling parameter, sometimes referred to as the cost of producing the first unit, and λ is a learning parameter, $\lambda > 0$, that could be identified as "localized learning" in the sense of Stiglitz [16].

The current marginal cost depends not only on current output, but also on carlier output, or

 $50 \times 10.00 \text{ in}$

The Experience Curve

The concept of declining costs and prices resulting from learning as expressed in the accumulated experience of a firm has been extensively developed and applied by the Boston Consulting Group (1968). Apparently the earliest identification of the particular form of the experience curve was found in the study of learning curves for airframes. Arrow (1962) utilized this form in his pioneering paper, "The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing," and the same form has been employed by the Boston Consulting Group.

The marginal cost function, called the experience curve, is

$$MC [E(t)] = C_1[E(t)]^{-\lambda}, \qquad (1)$$

4

where

Find

MC[E(t)] = the marginal cost of producing the Eth unit of output;

$$E(t)$$
 = accumulative output at time t ;

 C_1 = a scaling parameter, sometimes referred to as the cost of producing the first unit; and


$$\lambda = a$$
 learning-rate parameter, $\lambda > 0$.

The current marginal cost depends not only on current output but also on earlier output or experience. If time is measured in discrete units the $6.00 \times 9.50 in$

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
Hypothesis 2


Author produced just a single paper, then disappeared?



Hypothesis 3

A one-off 'moment of madness'? How to check?





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
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Competitive Bidding for Research

Hans W. Gottinger*

I INTRODUCTION

Many researchers are routinely responding to 'research initiatives' put forward by funding bodies such as research councils and the European Union, in which the funding body designates some area within which it wishes to see proposals. These initiatives in effect call for competitive tendering of research proposals by research teams. In many instances there is a high ratio of applications to actual grants, with the apparent implication that a lot of researcher effort has been wasted drawing up the unsuccessful proposals



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Hypothesis 4

Research Policy paper published in 1993, and Kyklos paper in 1996

Problem occurred only during a relatively brief period when Gottinger under stress?

Stopped once caught in 1999?



The background: economic and natural environment

In this section, the production, consumption and climatic aspects of the model are specified. As in a previous paper [1] we shall consider a world that consists of two countries. The two countries have the same preferences, the same production technology, the same climate, but (maybe) different population sizes. Two goods can be produced, one of which is an agricultural good and the other a manufactured good. The productivity of the agricultural sector is affected by the global temperature. The manufacturing activities, on the other hand, affect temperature level.

The formal specification of the model is as follows:

- time, denoted t, is discrete and the horizon is infinite: $t \in \{0,1,...\}$
- the world consists of two countries: Country H and Country F. Population in each country is constant over time.

Let the size of the world population be normalised to one country. Country H has a population of 'size' α while Country F has $1 - \alpha$. Population is immobile between countries. The two countries are assumed to have identical production technology, identical preferences and identical climate. In what follows, the production and consumption size of the model is specified for Country H. The variables of Country F which will be denoted by attaching a superscript '" can be specified in the same way.



2. ECONOMIC AND NATURAL ENVIRONMENT

ZHIOI CHEN

In this section the production, consumption, and climatic aspects of a world economy are specified. Roughly speaking, we shall consider a world that consists of two countries. Two goods are produced, one of which is an agricultural good and the other a manufactured good. The productivity of the agricultural sector is affected by the global temperature. The manufacturing activities, on the other hand, affect temperature.

The formal specification of the model follows. Time, denoted by t, is discrete and the horizon is infinite: $t \in \{0, 1...\}$. The world consists of two countries: H and F. Population in each country is constant over time. Let the size of world population be normalized to one. Country H has a population of size α , whereas country F. $1 - \alpha$.

The two countries are assumed to have identical production technologies, identical preferences, and identical climate. In what follows the production and consumption sides of the model are specified for country H. The variables of country F, which will be denoted by attaching a superscript *, can be specified in the same way.


On the production side of the world, two non-storable goods are produced, an agricultural good and a manufactured good, with quantities being denoted by X_1 and X2. Goods can be transported at zero cost.

There is a fixed continuum of firms in each industry. Hence both industries are perfectly competitive. Labor is the only input of production. At each date a representative firm in industry i (i = 1, 2) chooses the level of employment in the industry, l_{ii} .

The production technology of both goods exhibits constant returns to scale. The productivity of labor in the manufacturing sector does not depend on climate and is denoted by b. Output of the manufacturing sector at date t can then be written as $X_{2t} = bl_{2t}$. In the agricultural sector, however, the productivity of labor depends on one aspect of the climate, namely, the global temperature. Let $a(\tau_t)$ denote the productivity coefficient of the agricultural sector, i.e., $X_{1t} = a(\tau_t)l_{1t}$, where τ_t is the world average temperature level in period t.

The variable $a(\tau_r)$ captures the effects of global warming on agriculture. It is assumed that $a(\tau_n) > 0$; $a(\tau_n) = 0$; and $a'(\tau_n) < 0$ for all $\tau_n \in [\tau_n, \tau_n]$. The temperature level τ_n denotes the "natural" temperature level, i.e., the level at which the global temperature would stay in the absence of any manufacturing activities, while $\tau_{\rm u}~(>\tau_{\rm n})$ is the temperature level at which the agriculture productivity equals zero.1 Therefore, by assumption the agriculture productivity is positive when there have been no manufacturing activities. A higher level of temperature reduces the agriculture productivity.2 The agriculture productivity eventually approaches zero as temperature level reaches τ_a .

According to Cline [7], crop yields collapse to zero at 45°C



Abstract:

Vounworde.

We suggest a two-country, two-sector model as a basis for the control of global climate change in which the dynamic time path of the world economy is analysed under the provision that the outcomes of a negotiation game generate the global optimal solution.

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Incentive compatible environmental regulation

Hans Werner Gottinger

IIEEM and University of Maastricht (RL), Netherlands

Received 30 November 1999; accepted 23 April 2001

Optimal environmental regulations are derived in the presence of asymmetric information about regulations are derived in the presence of asymmetric information about regulations are derived to be induced through appropriate monitoring and a processor. The regulator commits to monitoring of compliance with the incentive compatible ergonomental regulator, and asymmetric information characterizes the interaction between the firm and regulator. The processor is abilities of a literaction between the firm and regulator. The processor is a literaction and asymmetric information characterizes the interaction between the firm and regulator. The processor is a literaction as a literaction and asymmetric information and asy

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Keywords: environmental regulation, asymmetric information, incentive compatibility, monitoring

1. Introduction

In the regulatory setting, it seems quit rease able to assume that firms have much tter inf rmation about their productive capabil. s ap ment opportunities than do the nator. In ₩ asymthe model of environmenta gulation 🔻 metric information which to ws, the realator anticipates the strategic respond of a firm possessing full informate about the t of pollution abatement. In the model it is assumed that the regulator can **a**ke a c**a**mitment to an incentive ch ne firm hooses a pollution schedule from 😿 el an receive corresponding sub-Form. v. regulator's problem ented as direct revelation game e repre r commits to an incentive ssigning abatement responsibility and subsidy to the firm on the basis of a anner cout by the form to the member

heoretical justification for the restriction to incentive compatible regulatory mechanism is provided by the revelation principle (Laffont and lirole, 1992). In the present context, the revelation principle states that for any indirect regulatory mechanism (and, in particular, any one in which the firm misrepresents its privately held information about abatement costs), a direct mechanism may be found which achieves the regulator's objective just as successfully and which also induces truthful revelation of the key information.

Attempts to construct incentive compatible environmental regulations (e.g. Kwerel, 1977, Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin, 1980, and Spulber, 1988) have neglected to address the equally important issue of enforcement. The connections between incentive-compatible standard setting and costly monitoring and enforcement have been insufficiently explored in the environmental economics

Now things are getting serious

- 1. A serial plagiariser
- 2. Did not stop after he was caught in 1999

Time to hand the case over to his employer for a full investigation of his other 100 articles and dozen books

Who is his university employer?

Hans-Werner Gottinger

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Hans-Werner Gottinger is the Director of the Institute of Management Science, University of Maastricht, The Netherlands and Professor of Economics at the University of Osaka (KGU), Japan. Studied mathematics and economics at the University of Goettingen and Munich, Germany. He worked with the Institute of Statistics, University of Munich (1968-70), Ford Foundation Fellow, University of California, Berkeley (1970-74), IME, University of Bielefeld, Germany (1974-80), Director (non-executive), Institute for Technological Forecasting and Assessment, Fraunhofer Gesellschaft, Bonn, Germany (1988-90), Visiting Professor, Oxford University and Faculty Fellow, Nuffield College (1990-91) and Amsterdam Institute of Finance, Amsterdam (2000-2002). He has consulted for many organisations, including IBM San Jose, California (1972-73), Stanford Research Institute (SRI), Menlo Park (1978-80), Battelle Institute (1984-86), Nomura Research Institute, Tokyo (1988, 1994-1996), and CICERO (Oslo), NERA, London (1997-98). Professor Gottinger_s research is on Economics and Management of Network Industries (Telecommunications and Energy), Regulatory Economics, Decision Analysis and Decision Support Systems, Managerial and Industrial Economics, Economic Methods and Models in Economic Policy Analysis and major projects undertaken with NTT, C&W, Statoil, US Environmental Protection Agency, TNO, IOPC (London), EU-ESPRIT, RACE, EU Competition Policy. He has published over 100 research articles in international professional journals, collected volumes: operations research, decision support systems, integrated economic modeling and policy analysis, managerial, industrial and regulatory economics, energy, environmental and resource economics. His major books include Foundations of Decision Analysis (in German, 1974); Subjective Probabilities (in German, 1974); Decision Theory and Social Ethics, with W. Leinfellner (1978); Elements of Statistical Analysis (1980); Coping with Complexity: Perspectives for Economics and Management (1983); The Management of Public Programs (in German, 1986); Elements of Statistical Analysis (1986); Artificial Intelligence: A Tool for Management and Business, with P. Weimann (1990); Economic Models of Solid Waste Management (1991); Hazardous Waste: Economic Risk Reductions, Special Issue of the International Journal of Environmental Pollution and Control (IJEP, 1997); Global Telecommunications and the Internet, with M. Takashima (1998); Global Environmental Economics (1998); Economies of Network Industries (2003); and Innovation, Technology and Hypercompetition (forthcoming by Routledge 2006). He is an Associate Editor of several international journals, Coeditor, Methods of Operations Research, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, International Journal of Technology Management and the International Journal of Managerial Decision-Making and Management.

Chathematical Social Sciences 14 (1987) 1–17

CHOICE AND COMPLEXITY

Hans W. GOTTINGER

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Communicated by F.W. Roush Received 6 May 1986

An attempt is made to propose a concept of limited rationality for choice functions based on computability theory in computer science.

Starting with the observation that it is possible to construct a machine simulating strategies of each individual in society, one machine for each individual's preference structure, we identify internal states of this machine with strategies or strategic preferences. Inputs are possible actions of other agents in society, thus society is effectively operating as a social choice machine. The

main result states that effective realization of choice functions is bound by the 'complexity of

been wasted drawing up the unsuccessful proposals

The situation resembles the case of socially wasteful rent seeking (Buchanan 1980), which appears not to have been treated as such in the design of bidding for research projects. From the results of modelling such a situation we could expect important policy conclusions for R&D and technology policy. It is also of more general concern whether excessive competition could be socially damaging, how and why? (Suzumura 1995) Related results pointing in the same direction are due to Dasgupta and Maskin (1987)

The basic facts motivate an examination of the process by which research is commissioned. A first question that arises is: how can the process be modelled? It seems reasonable to assume that researchers or their leaders are rational, and that they act rationally with respect to some objective functions. Scientific reputation and ratings depend importantly on assessments of research performance, and that is often judged by quantitative measures of both research output and research inputs. Research inputs in the form of funding from grant giving bodies have been seen as evidence of research activity rather than as a cost of

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Competitive positioning through strategic alliance formation: review and synthesis

Hans-Werner Gottinger

Institute of Economic Analysis, University of Osaka (KGU), Osaka, Japan E-mail: hansgottinger@aol.com

Abstract: This paper explores competitive positioning through network competition on the basis of alliance formation (strategic alliances, joint ventures). From a strategic perspective, technological competition will be refined and expanded into new markets, or new markets will be created through alliance formation. Alliance formation could speed up competitive positioning and technological leadership in strategically important, though geographically diverse, markets. Revenue management tools can help in linking alliance formation to better competitive outcomes, thereby improving strategic directions.

Keywords: competition; corporate governance; managerial economics; networks; revenue management; strategic alliance.

Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Gottinger, H-W. (2007) 'Competitive positioning through strategic alliance formation: review and synthesis', *Int. J. Revenue Management*, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp.200–216.

Bibliographic notes: Dr. Gottinger is a Professor of Economics at the University of Osaka (KGU), and the Director of the Institute of Management Science, Maastricht, NL. He has internationally taught and widely published in the areas of industrial, energy and environmental economics. In these areas he has also advised international organisations.

Universiteit Maastricht

Mr H.W. Gottinger Unterringstrasse 21 85051 Ingolstadt Germany

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Our reference

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treated by: J. Gerards

Maastricht 18.06.2007

Executive Board

Dear Mr Gottinger,

On several websites, including www.worldsustainable.org, you present yourself as 'Director of the Institute of Management Science, University of Maastricht in the Netherlands'.

This institute does not exist, nor have you been appointed or are you affiliated with Maastricht University (UM) or its institutes in any capacity whatsoever. We have received complaints about this incorrect designation, which is harmful to the university's reputation.

UM cannot allow third parties to formally present themselves as being part of its organisation. Therefore, the Executive Board summons you to ensure that all erroneous and false information is removed without delay from the websites and publications in which it appears.

Should you fail to do so within fourteen days, we will be forced to take legal action.

Yours sincerely,

Dr.J.M.M. Ritzen

President

Maastricht University Executive Board

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
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VAT ID EU NL003475268B01 by research teams. In many instances there is a high ratio of applications to actual grants, with the apparent implication that a lot of researcher effort has been wasted drawing up the unsuccessful proposals

The situation resembles the case of socially wasteful rent seeking (Buchanan 1980), which appears not to have been treated as such in the design of bidding for research projects. From the results of modelling such a situation we could expect important policy conclusions for R&D and technology policy. It is also of more general concern whether excessive competition could be socially damaging, how and why? (Suzumura 1995) Related results pointing in the same direction are due to Dasgupta and Maskin (1987)

The basic facts motivate an examination of the process by which research is commissioned. A first question that arises is: how can the process be modelled? It seems reasonable to assume that researchers or their leaders are rational, and that they act rationally with respect to some objective functions. Scientific reputation and ratings depend importantly on assessments of research performance, and that is often judged by quantitative measures of both research output and research inputs. Research inputs in the form of funding from grant giving bodies have been seen as evidence of research activity rather than as a cost of

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Econometric modelling, estimation and policy analysis of oil spill processes

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Author: Gottinger, Hans W.1

Source: International Journal of Environment and Pollution, Volume 15, Number 3, 17 September 2004, pp. 333-363(31)

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
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This paper explores approaches to model specification suitable for empirical investigation of a stochastic oil spill model. We focus on the effects of economic incentive measures on the frequency of oil spills, spill size, and volume of oil spilled. We look into the relationships between parameters that describe the spill generation process and the enforcement effort, using dat for the Black and Baltic Seas.

Keywords: ENVIRONMENTAL JOURNALS; Environment and Sustainable Development

Document Type: Research article DOI: 10.1504/IJEP.2001.005271

Affiliations: 1: International Institute for Environmental Economics and Management (IIRRM), Schloss Waldsee, D 88339, Bad Waldsee, Germany



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
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
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
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
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
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
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




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Hypothesis 5

Although it may occasionally slip up with regard to ensuring the research integrity of publications, the peer-review process works much more thoroughly when it comes to the selection of individuals, for example in choosing the Chair and Head of Department.




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Earth Community Organization (ECO) the Global Community

Research Paper

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
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Hypothesis 6

Peer review works even more thoroughly when choosing the Rector/President of a University.





Die Presse

Uni Salzburg - Acht Kandidaten für Rektorswahl.

153 words 19 May 1998 Die Presse German (c) Die Presse 1998 www.diepresse.at.

Die Wahl des Rektors wird am 17. Juni stattfinden.

WIEN (red.). Mit einer Rekordzahl an Bewerbungen wird am 17. Juni die Wahl des Rektors der Universität Salzburg - für eine Amtszeit von vier Jahren - stattfinden. Bis jetzt haben sich acht Kandidaten gemeldet (in alphabetischer Reihenfolge: @KK Univ.-Prof. Dr. Manfred Buchroithner (Kartographie an der TU Dresden); @KK Univ.-Prof. Dr. Hans **Gottinger** (Managerial and Environmental Economics, University of Maastricht, Niederlande); @KK Univ.-Prof. Dr. Adolf Haslinger (Germanistik, derzeit Rektor in Salzburg); @KK Dipl.-Informatiker Günter Koch (IT & Telematics, Austrian Research Centers); @KK Univ.-Prof. Dipl.-Ing. Dr. Werner Koenne (Computerwissenschaft, Uni Salzburg); @KK Prof. Dr. Joachim Kohlhof (Betriebswirtschaftslehre, HS für Wirtschaft und Technik, Brandenburg); @KK Prof. DDr. Heiner Timmermann (Neue Geschichte an den Unis Jener, Budapest, Sundsvall und Moskau); @KK Univ.-Prof. Dr. Felix Unger (Herzchirurgie am Landeskrankenhaus Salzburg).

Document diep000020010922du5j00co1

RP and Nature go public

August 2007 – Nature article and RP editorial

What happened next?

Deluge of new information

Number of confirmed cases of plagiarism rose from 3 to 14

- 9 got past referees & editors and were published
- only 5 caught before publication

6 instances where Gottinger fired/forced to resign

- for plagiarism
- for having 2 full-time jobs & 2 salaries at the same time
- for forging letters of support in an EU grant application

Gottinger's institutional affiliations

1968 Research Assistant, Netherlands School of Economics, Rotterdam 1969-70 Lecturer, Institute of Econometrics and Statistics, University of Munich

1970-72 Ford Foundation Fellow, Department of Statistics and Economics, UC Berkeley

1972-73 IBM Laboratories, San Jose, California

1973Lecturer, Department of Economics, Univ of California, Santa Barbara

1973-80 Professor, Department of Sociology, Bielefeld University

1974Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, UC Berkeley

1974International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Austria 1976-79 Professor, Interfaculty of Management & Organization, Groningen University

1977Laboratoire d'Automatique & d'Analyse des Systems (LAAS) Toulouse 1979-84 Group leader, National Research Center for Environment & Health (GSF), Neuherberg

1983 Visiting Professor, Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley

1983 Visiting Research Fellow, JFK School of Government, Harvard

Hypothesis 7

While an individual might be able to get away with plagiarism in a few cases over short period of time, the self-policing mechanisms of the academic community will ensure that he/she cannot continue with this over a prolonged period, let alone make a career out of it.



Automatica, Vol. 14, p.299

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF PRIORITY

It was noticed that the contents of a paper published in the Dutch Journal "Annals of System Research", and also in the Romanian Journal, "Economic Computation and Economic Cybernetics Studies and Research" as well as the French Journal, "R.A.I.R.O.", closely resembled those of a paper previously published in Automatica although the similarity was not acknowledged. Consequently the following note was submitted for publication in Automatica—Editor.

This is to acknowledge that the papers entitled "Information Structures in Dynamic Team Decision Problems" that appeared in the Journals, "Annals of System Research" Vol. 4 (1974), "Economic Computation and Economic Cibernetic Studies and Research", Vol. 4 (1975) and "Revere Française d'Automatique, Information et Recherche Operationnelle" (R.A.I.R.O.), Vol. 10, (1976) under my name contain essentially all ideas, methods and conclusions that have been obtained before in a paper on Multi-Person Control Problems entitled "Information Structure in Dynamic Multi-person Control Problems" by Y. C. Ho and K. C. Chu published in Automatica Vol. 10, (1974). I fully regret this incident.

Hans W. Gottinger University of Groningen Netherlands

Conclusion

Does self-policing work? In this case,

- plagiarism extended over 30 years
- the plagiarist got to 'top' of profession
- he did not stop when detected
- detectors assumed that 'first offence' and gave quiet 'slap on the wrist', &/or too embarrassed to pursue further
- bogus Maastricht professorship not detected for 24 years

This shouldn't have happened!

Need to revisit assumption that self-policing works

Greater vigilance and willingness to pursue wellfounded suspicions required from all

- editors, referees, readers, publishers need to be alert
- universities need to investigate suspicious cases
- database to log 1st time (& repeat) offenders?

Conclusion

If have suspicions, don't leave it to 'someone else' to sort out problem

A form of 'tragedy of the commons'

 Too much hassle for individual to pursue, but in long run makes overall situation worse for academic community

Cf. findings from game theory experiments

- Co-operators VS defectors
- Punishers VS 'second-order free-riders'

Task of 'punishing' comes at a cost to you Editors and universities must be prepared to incur that 'cost' if plagiarism and other research misconduct to be kept in check


The end of the matter?


August 2007

- Editorial in Research Policy
- Exposé in Nature & newspapers in Germany, Austria, Netherlands etc.
- HWG told Nature that now 'semi-retired'

Stopped producing papers?

Stopped creating new affiliations and institutes?





The proposals received will be reviewed by the Selection Committee to ensure a high quality and appropriate mix for the conference. The general the Selection Committee is to provide a diverse set of tutorials that attract a large interest among the broad segments within the diverse single community.

Tutorial

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Industrial Economics and Management - PART I



Hans Werner Gottinger
Professor of Managerial and Industrial Economics
Institute Director
STRATEC, TU Munich, Germany

Abstract

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Objectives: This part covers basic and advanced economic and managerial issues of modern industrial economics. Network effects are ento high technology and service industries in a universal sense, and they experience managerial problems that are different to those in conventional markets. They are circumscribed by relentless, high speed dynamic competition with ever shortening product cycles. Even be

THE END

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Do not plagiarise!

'The Talented Professor Gottinger'
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Directed by Anthony Minghella Starring Robin Williams Coming to a cinema near you!